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Abstract
This article analyzes the validity of some of the most often-heard criticism against ISDS. It
concludes that most of that criticism is neither supported by statistical evidence nor by the
practice of international arbitration law. Consequently, this article cautions against the current
hyper-activism to reform or even to dismantle some of the salient features of investor-state
dispute settlement (ISDS), and instead, calls for a rational and balanced debate based on facts
with a view to improving the ISDS system where necessary in an orderly fashion.
(*)
1 INTRODUCTION
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force almost six years ago, the European Commission
began developing its own European Union (EU) investment policy. The core of this new
investment policy is the agreement of trade and investment treaties with strategically
important countries.
In the context of these negotiations, the critique against investor-state dispute settlement
(ISDS), which is contained in practically all Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) as well as in
recently concluded Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) such as the EU-Canada Treaty (CETA) and the
EU-Singapore Treaty, has become more vocal. It seems that the current heated debate in
Europe regarding the EU’s investment policy is comparable to what the United States went
through in the past decade when it updated its Model BIT text of 2004, and more recently of
2012. Europe is experiencing similar growing pains as the United States when calibrating its
investment policy. However, the situation of the EU is more complicated because in the
previous fifty years the Member States developed individually their investment policy by
concluding about 1,500 BITs with the rest of the world.
More specifically, since June 2013, the EU and the United States have been negotiating the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Agreement, the first preferential trade
and investment agreement between the two dominant economic players worldwide. The
European Commission is negotiating the agreement on the basis of Directives issued by the
Council and it consults continuously with the Member States, members of the European
Parliament and civil society throughout the process. The defenders of TTIP argue that the
agreement would result in multilateral economic growth, while its critics claim that it would
increase corporate power-houses and make it more difficult for governments to regulate
markets for public benefit. 
The inclusion of ISDS in the Agreement is considered to encourage investment flows. The
European Commission argues that ISDS helps to attract, and more importantly maintain US
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows into the EU and, therefore, needs to be included in the
trade agreement. However, some radical critics see it as a ‘Trojan horse’ enhancing the
power of US companies at the expense of national sovereignty and interests. In an attempt
to appease the critics, the European Commission had paused the negotiations on ISDS for a few
months and launched a public consultation on the topic. European Federation for
Investment Law and Arbitration (EFILA) also participated in this consultation. The results of
this consultation were that about 150,000 submissions were received by the European
Commission. These submissions motivated changes in EU investment policies such as
discussions on the introduction of an appellate mechanism or the creation of a permanent
court.
Among the concerns raised were the supposedly pro-investor interpretation of investment
treaty provisions and their perceived unpredictability; the alleged lack of transparency of
arbitral proceedings; the alleged lack of independence and impartiality of arbitrators. It was
also alleged that ISDS bypasses the operation of domestic law and national courts and stymies
the right of states to regulate. Criticisms have also been raised against the investor-state
arbitration process itself, claiming that it allows partisan, self-interested arbitrators to secretly
overrule governments with no right of appeal. This article will examine the validity of all those
criticisms by providing an in-depth analysis, based on arbitration practice and literature.
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2 PRO-INVESTOR INTERPRETATION OF SUBSTANTIVE TREATY PROTECTIONS
2.1 Pro-investor interpretation of investment treaties
To verify the validity of the argument that arbitral tribunals apply a broad pro-investor
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interpretation of substantive protection provisions, it would be necessary (at least at an
initial stage of research) to implement a quantitative and qualitative analysis of investment
arbitration final awards ‘favouring’ the investor on the merits. From the outset, it is important to
make some (general) language differentiations; an award decided in favour of the state is an
award in which the investor’s claims are dismissed and/or counterclaims are successful; an
award decided in favour of the investor is an award in which the investor’s claim wins on the
merits and is entitled to payment and/or compensation; and a pro-jurisdiction award is an
award were the tribunal finds jurisdiction without deciding on the merits of the dispute. Some
literature has tried to argue that a tribunal upholding its jurisdiction is in favour of the investor.
However, there is no causal link between a finding on jurisdiction and an arbitral tribunal
ultimately being pro-investor on the merits of the case.
In fact, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCTAD) World Investment
Report of 2014 contains the following statistics: ‘arbitral developments...brought the overall of
concluded cases to 274, of these, approximately 43% of cases were decided in favour of the
State, 31% in favour of the investor and 27% were settled.’ The 2014 UNCTAD statistics also
reveal that from all the cases where the tribunal found that it had jurisdiction, a majority was
eventually decided in favour of states. In this context, the suggestion that a pro-investor
interpretation is applied to substantive protections seems not to be accurate. Rather, one
could argue that ISDS provides for a stable balance between the protection of investors and the
protection of states’ regulatory powers. Indeed, UNCTAD figures confirm that states continue to
win more cases than investors, thus the pro-investor argument is unfounded. This is also
confirmed by the latest International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)
statistics (2015-1), which show that only 46% of all ICSID awards upheld claims in part or in full,
while 53% of the claims were dismissed either for lack of jurisdiction or on the merits. One per
cent of the claims were manifestly without legal merit. At the very least, the outcomes of all
known investment arbitration cases indicated that by the end of 2014 arbitral tribunals were in
most cases ruling not in favour of investors, but rather in favour of states.
The above statistics serve only to dispel the claim that the majority of investment cases are
decided in favour of the investor. In this regard it is worth highlighting that the measure of
whether arbitral tribunals are fair or pro-investor cannot be conclusively ascertained by looking
at the percentage of cases won. Critics of the system who focus on the numbers of cases won or
lost are masking the more vital question: Do investors win more cases than they should win,
because ISDS is somehow canted in their favour? Such a question, which will be addressed
below, cannot be objectively determined through statistics.
It is not a coincidence that most currently existing International Investment Agreements (IIAs)
contain very broad definitions of protected investments and investors as well as broad
provisions describing substantive levels of protection (fair and equitable treatment, direct
expropriation, etc.). States realize that by broadening the scope of the protection of investors
and investments they increase their chances of attracting FDI. It is not a broad and creative
interpretation by arbitral tribunals, which expands the field of investment arbitration, but
precisely the consciously broad wording of IIAs, which constitute boundaries for arbitral
tribunals. In other words, based on a calculation of advantages offered by the IIAs, i.e., greater
flow of FDIs, it has been a conscious decision of states parties to IIAs to include very broad
language which provides protection to all imaginable investments and investors. The validity of
this approach has been confirmed by a recently published study of the Dutch Statistical Office
which shows that FDI flows increase by 35% after ratification of a BIT. Of course, states are
equally able to limit the scope of protected investors and investments in future IIAs. Indeed, we
can observe this trend in relation to the treaties signed or currently negotiated by the EU (CETA
and TTIP). 
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2.2 Available means of interpretation
Moving from case outcomes to legal content analysis, so far there is no qualitative research to
prove a pro-investor expansive approach on issues of legal interpretation of substantive
standards. 
Previous analysis on diversity and harmonization of treaty interpretation has found that
there is no preferable method of treaty interpretation. In particular, there are no findings
proving a preference for expansive interpretation of substantive protections, but rather a
diversified system using a wide range of treaty interpretation mechanisms depending on the
specific needs of the case in dispute. Due to the broad substantive protections granted to
investors in BITs, arbitral tribunals have sought to rely on restrictive, expansive, and neutral
interpretation techniques commonly known in the international public law sphere.
All IIAs, as treaties signed by two or more states, are governed by public international law.
Therefore, the point of departure for all arbitral tribunals to interpret IIAs is the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), an instrument concluded by most states in the
world and reflecting customary international law. As correctly pointed out in a recent study
prepared at the request of the European Parliament: 
[b]y abandoning the methodology of interpretation enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties the tribunals would free themselves from the bonds of their masters, i.e. the
state parties to the investment treaties. 
(14)
(15) 
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In fact, arbitral tribunals in investment cases always rely on means of interpretation provided
in Article 31 (General rule of interpretation) of the VCLT. Sometimes, but very rarely, tribunals
also rely on Article 32 which provides supplementary means of interpretation. Article 31 of the
VCLT states that:
[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
Article 32 VCLT further clarifies that the context of a treaty should comprise, inter alia, its text,
Preamble, annexes, and other documents prepared in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty or documents accepted as such by the parties. The purpose and object of all IIAs, usually
found in Preambles, is encouragement and reciprocal protection of investments. 
Accordingly, prima facie, the perception may arise that the interpretation of broad provisions
of the IIAs may be favourable for investors. However, despite such broad language included
in Preambles and the Treaty itself, many arbitral tribunals chose to follow ‘a balanced
approach to the interpretation of the Treaty’s substantive provisions for the protection of
investments’. 
For example, a restrictive approach has been used when arbitral tribunals have found
ambiguity in the scope of umbrella clauses. Tribunals tend to choose a more conservative and
prudential approach under the principle of ‘in dubio pars mittor est sequenda’ (SGS v. Pakistan
and Noble Ventures v. Romania ).
Equally, some tribunals have embraced an ‘expansive’ interpretative method in accordance
with the object and purpose of the BIT, which is ‘to create and maintain favourable conditions
for investments by investors of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other’. Given
that the intention of states in negotiating and creating BITs is to create a broad framework to
attract FDI and create legal certainty, it is somewhat difficult to argue that an expansive
approach is favourable for the investor, since arbitral tribunals are only interpreting treaty
provisions in line with the states’ express intention at the time of the BITs’ creation.
Furthermore, as indicated by UNCTAD in its most recent World Investment Report, many of the
most recently concluded IIAs contain in their Preambles sustainable development-oriented
features, which are further supplemented by ‘treaty elements that aim more broadly at
preserving regulatory space for public policies of host countries and/or at minimizing exposure
to investment arbitration’. 
Moreover, sometimes in their reasoning arbitral tribunals review past decisions related to
similar provisions found in other IIAs in order to arrive at their own judgment. However, as the
principle of precedent does not exist in international law, it is claimed that this may lead
to inaccurate decisions which disregard the actual intention of the states parties to the
particular treaty under consideration. On this basis, critiques recommend that the ISDS
system should be reformed and that there should be an appeal mechanism system to ensure
that states remain masters of their treaties or that states should be able to issue a binding
interpretation of provisions of the treaties. 
This conclusion not only fails to recognize that international courts and tribunals, such as the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) itself, often rely on their past decisions. It also fails to
recognize the fact that the states parties when creating the ISDS system have already
established a necessary system of checks and balances in order to protect them from the
creative interpretation of arbitral tribunals. The ultimate sanction imposed by the ISDS system
on arbitral tribunals for failure to respect the limits imposed on it by states parties to the
investment treaties is annulment of the awards. Indeed, states have successfully used the
annulment procedure. Nevertheless, it is recognized by many practitioners of investment
arbitration that the annulment system as currently designed has some shortcomings and should
be improved. 
To conclude, statistical evidence proves that states continue to win more cases, which means
that arbitral tribunals do not decide pro-investor. On the contrary, arbitral tribunals make
balanced decisions, which are informed by the relevant jurisprudence and literature.
(18) (19)
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3 DIVERGENT INTERPRETATION OF SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL IIA PROVISIONS:
INCONSISTENCY AND UNPREDICTABILITY OF DECISIONS
Another often heard critique is that even though many IIAs contain very similar or identical
provisions, investment arbitral tribunals tend to interpret them differently from case-to-case.
This, critics say, precludes the emergence of a consistent body of law. However, it must be
recalled from the outset that international investment law is not based on one multilateral
treaty, but rather on a web of more than 3,000 investment treaties, FTAs, and other similar
instruments designed to foster international trade and protect foreign investors and their
investments. These treaties have been negotiated between different states parties, which
logically reflect divergent preferences and needs.
Since investment arbitral tribunals are established on an ad hoc, one-off basis, based on each
individual treaty, the decisions of the tribunals are based on the respective treaty.
Consequently, the decisions of these tribunals are bound to be based upon the substantive
rules on a case-by-case basis. This fact clearly is a significant limitation towards achieving
convergence.
P8
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Nonetheless, it must also be acknowledged that no arbitral tribunal is operating in ‘clinical
isolation’, but rather refers extensively to previous relevant decisions of other arbitral
tribunals. At the same time, it is important to note that the system of binding precedent is not
applicable in international investment law. Indeed, the system of a binding precedent is
generally not applied in public international law. Similarly, to investment arbitral tribunals,
judgments of the ICJ have no binding force except between the parties and in respect of the
particular case. Even if the system of binding precedent were incorporated into the system
of international law, tribunals would not be able to fully rely on the interpretation of similar or
identical provisions by other tribunals as the states parties’ intent and negotiating history
differ from treaty to treaty.
This reality has long been recognized by investment arbitral tribunals and other tribunals, as
confirmed by a tribunal in Methanex Corporation v. United States of America:
As to the third general principle, the term is not to be examined in isolation or in abstracto, but
in the context of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose. One result of this third
general principle, being relevant to Methanex’s first argument on GATT jurisprudence and
Article 1102 NAFTA, is that, as noted by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in the
MOX Plant case (as also applied in the OSPAR case): ‘the application of international law rules
on interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions of different treaties may not yield
the same results, having regard to, inter alia, differences in the respective contexts, objects and
purposes, subsequent practice of parties and travaux préparatoires.’ 
The facts of the cases decided by arbitral tribunals in investment disputes, even though similar,
differ substantially, and at least as much as the economic and political realities differ between
those sovereign states which signed the investment protection agreements. In other words, by
their very nature investment disputes are bred from diverging realties and so this is sometimes
reflected in the decisions of arbitral tribunals. When arbitral tribunals sometimes arrive at
diverging views and different interpretations, one should not regard this as a failure of the
system, but rather as a reminder that by its very nature the system is fragmented. 
In the absence of a multilateral investment treaty to regulate the entire body of investment law
some divergences in treaty interpretations are a natural consequence of the system – system
which over the past thirty years has nonetheless produced a fairly robust body of investment
case law. Based on this case law, it can instead be argued that in spite of the web of broadly
similar but not identical treaties on which investment law is based, there is still a high degree
of consistency amongst tribunal decisions.
(31) 
(32) 
(33)
P9
(34)
4 LACK OF TRANSPARENCY IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES
Investment arbitration is continually evolving and the question of transparency of the arbitral
process is no exception. Transparency has been a principle under development for the last
twenty years of the ISDS system, which has been taken into account for a long time as an
evolving principle of the investment arbitration practice in its different expressions (i.e.,
Dominican Republic–Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR), North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), amicus curiae, and third party rights, etc.). 
Transparency has evolved into its new role by positioning itself as a global norm in
international investment law by means of the 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-
based Investor-State Arbitration, which has been adopted by the members of UNCITRAL.
(35)
(36) 
4.1 Transparency in CAFTA, NAFTA and ICSID 2006 amendments
The evolving practice of transparency in investor-state arbitration can be seen in the Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and the North American Free Trade Agreement
provisions, which allow non-disputing party participation. This Free Trade Agreement practice
arose due to the fact that despite arbitral awards having confined and binding effects only on
the disputing parties, other non-disputing states parties can have the opportunity to
influence the treaty interpretation analysis of future awards.
For example, Article 10.20.2 of the CAFTA-DR includes the possibility of a non-disputing state
party (but CAFTA signatory ) to participate in an on-going investor-state arbitration case by
submitting its opinion on issues of treaty interpretation that arise in that specific case. For this
purpose, CAFTA, Article 10.21 obliges the respondent (state party) to transmit certain documents
in relation to the arbitral procedure to the non-disputing states parties which permits them to
become fully informed on the issues of that case before submitting their briefs to the arbitral
tribunal (Commerce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. El Salvador). 
The CAFTA provisions on the participation of non-disputing states parties were influenced by
the NAFTA practice. NAFTA, Article 1128 was the first treaty provision stipulating the right to
make submissions by a non-disputing state party, which has been invoked in many NAFTA cases
(Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada; Methanex Corp. v. United States and UPS Inc. v. Canada; 
Mobil v. Canada; ADF v. United States; Bayview Irrigation et al. v. Mexico; Chemtura
Corp. v. Canada et al., and most recently in Mesa Power Group LLC v. Canada ). Overall,
the CAFTA and NAFTA practice of allowing participation of a non-disputing state party into
arbitral proceedings dismisses the argument of lack of transparency in investment arbitration.
Conversely, it illustrates the efforts investment law has made in pursing transparency in many
and diverse ways, for example, by monitoring not only pending cases but also by influencing
P10
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and submitting opinions on issues affecting treaty interpretation of further disputes.
Moreover, in 2006 the ICSID Rules were amended in order to enable non-dispute parties to
intervene in arbitration proceedings and attend hearings. The new rules promote the disclosure
of ICSID awards.
The other relevant amendment is in ICSID Rule 48, according to which the Centre must promptly
include in its publications excerpts of the legal rules applied by arbitral tribunals. The aim of
this amendment is to provide public access to the legal reasoning of the tribunals. Indeed,
all ICSID awards, which compromise about two-thirds of all ISDS awards, are published on the
ICSID website and are freely accessible to the public. This amendment to Rule 48
contributes to the construction of public case law and that in turn serves not only to provide
persuasive reasoning for future ICSID tribunals but also ensures arbitral tribunals are subject to
public scrutiny.
(47) 
(48) 
4.2 Amicus curiae
In addition to the submissions by non-disputing states parties, international investment law
has also accepted amicus curiae (meaning ‘friend of the court’) submissions by non-disputing
third parties. With an amicus curiae brief a non-disputing third party seeks to participate in a
specific investment arbitration dispute in order to provide a neutral and well-supported
opinion regarding an issue of public concern. Mostly, amicus participants in investment
arbitration proceedings have been non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Arbitral tribunals
have recognized the important value of amicus briefs, highlighting that in addition to
representing civil society, an amicus should demonstrate how its background, experience,
expertise, and special perspectives can assist the tribunal in the particular case. Thus, the
amicus practice has accompanied and supported the development of transparency in
investment arbitration by enabling issues concerning the general public interest to be
considered within the arbitral process. 
(49) 
(50) 
P12
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4.3 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration
Although, there is no general obligation of confidentiality in investment arbitration, there
has been a general presumption of respecting the principles of confidentiality and privacy in
investment treaty arbitration procedures. The new 2014 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency
reverse the general presumption on confidentiality by seeking to establish a balance between
protecting confidential business information and national interests, on the one hand, and
openness, on the other hand. The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules cover all stages of the
arbitration proceedings, including submissions to arbitral tribunals, arbitral awards, and the
participation of non-disputing third parties such as the already mentioned amicus curiae.
Moreover, these Rules are not only available for UNCITRAL or ad hoc arbitrations, but also for
other arbitral proceedings initiated under other rules if they opt into them. Moreover, the free
publication of information and documents submitted in arbitration proceedings has been a
well-established practice by some widely well-known free databases, including the List of
Pending and Concluded ICSID Cases, the publication of ECT cases, and the Permanent Court
of Arbitration (PCA) Repository. The UNCITRAL Transparency Rules reinforce this practice by
providing for free publication of all the information submitted in an arbitral procedure (Articles
2 and 3), as well as requiring open hearings (Article 6). Indeed, the trend continues towards even
more transparency, as is underlined by the new draft investment treaties between the EU and
Canada and Singapore, respectively. 
At the same time, international investment arbitration literature has also discussed the
possible downsides of unrestricted transparency, which fall under four categories: cost; delay;
impaired confidentiality; and weakened secrecy. The first two elements are closely related as
the prolongation of the process typically will be reflected in the financial costs (i.e., the
logistics in order to make some information public, such as translations, and make it available
could incur costs in personnel needed); publicity also is related to the danger of re-
politicization of investment disputes. 
To conclude, over the past decade, the investment arbitration community and states have
continuously sought to implement a wide range of effective tools that support its legitimacy as
a system of investment global governance, where transparency has been a key tool for the
accountability of investment arbitration.
Transparency has different expressions, with all of them being exercised within the sphere of
investment arbitration practice. The new UNCITRAL Transparency Rules have been welcomed by
the investment arbitration community since they seek to strike an appropriate balance
between confidentiality and more openness. Indeed, the participation of non-disputing parties,
the submission of amicus curiae briefs, the expansion of investment arbitration scholarship,
and free access to many case law databases, have played an important role in supporting the
argument of investment arbitration as a transparent system. Furthermore, in the TTIP
negotiations, the EU and its Member States have been actively pushing for more transparency
in the investment chapter. The reality is that the system has never been so transparent and
the criticism that there is a lack of transparency in ISDS is not supported by the developments
and improvements of the past decade.
(52) 
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5 LACK OF INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF ARBITRATORS
Some critics claim that investment arbitration proceedings are affected by lack of
independence and impartiality of the arbitrators. If true, such allegations could indeed have
severe consequences and certainly might raise legitimate concerns as to the viability of the
system. However, such allegations need to be analyzed and reviewed on a case-by-case basis
and not as a general objection against the investment arbitration system. In other words, it is
up to the parties in the individual dispute to prove any lack of independence and impartiality
of the arbitrators or any other procedural irregularities by challenging the arbitrators.
Therefore, the appropriate question is rather whether the system of investment arbitration
includes mechanisms (at the parties’ disposal) envisaging challenge procedures and designed
to avoid partiality and prejudice of arbitrators, and not whether all arbitrators are biased,
since they (financially) depend on the survival of the investment arbitration system in its
current shape. 
A closer analysis proves that impartiality and independence can be (and regularly are)
challenged on different levels of the investment arbitration system, namely, pursuant to (i)
national laws (if applicable); (ii) institutional rules; and (iii) the International Bar Association
Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration (‘IBA Guidelines’). These three
levels will be discussed in turn.
First, let us examine a hypothetical example at the national law level. For illustrative purposes,
it has been decided to select Dutch and Swedish law, which arguably are very influential in the
investment arbitration context. The choice is not accidental. According to the UNCTAD World
Investment Report 2014, most arbitration proceedings are conducted (respectively) by the
UNCITRAL International Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Rules) and the Arbitration Rules of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC Rules). All the UNCITRAL cases considered by UNCTAD in
their statistics were cases administered by the PCA. Presumably, in most of the cases being held
in the PCA which may also have The Hague as the seat of arbitration, Dutch law is of relevance.
The same applies to Swedish arbitration law, when the SCC Rules are applicable to the dispute
and the seat of arbitration is Stockholm. The Dutch Arbitration Act (DAA), which entered into
force as of 1 January 2015, states in Article 1033 that: ‘an arbitrator may be challenged if
circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence.’
Moreover, a challenge can, at the request of either party, eventually be brought before the
President of the District Court in The Hague, who will decide on the merits of the challenge. 
Section 8 of the Swedish Arbitration Act (SAA) provides a fairly detailed definition of what
constitutes impartiality and allows for recourse to the court with regard to a challenge. 
Second, in case of ICSID proceedings, it is also provided that in case of an arbitrator’s
presumable bias, parties may bring an adequate action against this member of the arbitral
tribunal. For example, the ICSID Convention explicitly requires arbitrators to ‘be persons of high
moral character and recognized competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance,
who may be relied upon to exercise independent judgment’ and an arbitrator may be
disqualified if he/she manifestly lacks any of the above-mentioned qualities. Indeed, in
recent ICSID cases (e.g., Caratube v. Kazakhstan; Blue Bank v. Venezuela; and Burlington
Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador ) arbitrators were successfully disqualified on the
basis of these circumstances. Similarly, the 2010 UNCITRAL Rules provide that ‘[a]ny arbitrator
may be challenged if circumstances exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to the
arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.’ Finally, the SCC Rules also oblige individuals
serving as arbitrators to be independent and impartial. Interestingly, a challenge may be
brought not only in circumstances giving rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s
impartiality or independence, but also if an arbitrator does not possess qualifications agreed
by the parties. All of these rules not only allow submitting a challenge in case of doubt, but
also require candidates for arbitrators to submit a statement of independence confirming their
independence and impartiality. Those rules also pre-emptively cover the issue whether the
prospective arbitrator may accept an appointment or where a certain risk of bias exists. 
Third, reference must be made to the IBA Guidelines. In a nutshell, the IBA Guidelines
comprise two parts: the first part introduces general standards of impartiality, independence,
and disclosure, whereas the second part entitled ‘Practical Application of the General
Standards’ sets out three lists (red, orange, and green) of potential conflicts of interests that
may occur in arbitration. Clearly, the application of the IBA Guidelines helps to identify the
circumstances in which there is a likelihood of conflict of interests. The IBA Guidelines are
regularly relied upon in cases of challenges of arbitrators. In addition, conceivably, they gain
additional weight and authority by being mentioned in (draft) investment treaties such as CETA.
In sum, the system of investment arbitration includes effective mechanisms that can be used
against an allegedly biased arbitrator. These tools include actions for challenge before national
courts and within the arbitral institutions. The arbitration community took a bottom-up
initiative to improve the standard of impartiality and independence applicable to the
arbitrators (see IBA Guidelines). While ‘new’ and ‘better’ standards can still be developed, the
investment arbitration system in its current form ensures that arbitrators are impartial and
independent.
P14
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6 ‘ELITE’ GROUP OF ARBITRATORS
Corporate Europe Observatory identified fifteen individuals, which it called ‘an elite 15’ and
claimed that ‘15 arbitrators have captured the decision making in 55% of the total investment
treaty cases known today’. What the report fails to properly address, however, is the
underlying fundamental principle of international arbitration, namely, the principle of party
autonomy. In the system of international arbitration, parties are free to structure the procedure
as they wish, but also, most importantly, to select and appoint an arbitrator of their own choice.
This freedom of selecting the arbitrator applies to both the claimant (the investor) and to
the respondent (the state). As a consequence, the fact that some arbitrators are more often
selected than others is a result of party choice.
The Corporate Europe Observatory Report itself highlights that ‘the elite 15 have been
repeatedly ranked as top arbitrators by well-known surveys’. It only proves that these
individuals are at the top of their profession and, as such, it does not come as a surprise that,
where the stakes are high, parties to the proceedings (thus both the investor and the state)
prefer to have seasoned arbitrators on the tribunal. The Corporate Europe Observatory table
(assuming that it contains correct information) with ‘a few biographic details you might not find
in the industry’s own rankings’ shows exactly that this ‘elite 15’ is a highly experienced
group of arbitrators. In fact, it lists individuals that were judges of international courts and
tribunals, persons with experience in policy-making, and former diplomats. It is fair to assume
that these individuals are perfectly capable of dealing with complex disputes of public law
character and have broad experience, which is clearly not restricted to commercial law
disputes.
Moreover, the Corporate Europe Observatory Report shows the ‘frequency of elite arbitrators
sitting side-by-side as co-arbitrators’, inclining, as the title of the section suggests, to ‘keep
investment arbitration cases in the family’. Again, it must be stressed that parties appoint
arbitrators (but for a presiding arbitrator). Therefore ‘elite arbitrators’ can (generally) sit
together on one panel only when: parties appointed them, or where one of them was appointed
and the second one is a presiding arbitrator. Presiding arbitrators will be selected by (i)
agreement of the parties; or (ii) joint decision of party-appointed arbitrators (thus
indirectly by the parties); or (iii) the appointing authority (such as ICSID, the SCC or the
PCA). It is therefore not accurate to present these fifteen arbitrators as a clique that has the
decisive vote on how a composition of a tribunal in a random case is formed, since it is only the
parties to the dispute that have a vote in the selection procedure.
For example, the Corporate Europe Observatory Report itself describes Brigitte Stern as the
‘State’s favourite choice as arbitrator’. Indeed, recently she has been challenged in several
cases for her repeat appointments by states (e.g., CEAC Holdings Ltd. v. Montenegro and
Highbury International AVV, Compañía Minera de Bajo Caroní AVV, and Ramstein Trading Inc. v.
Venezuela ). As highlighted earlier, parties are free to choose their appointees to the
arbitral panel. It is logical that they will select persons they expect to be more sensitive to their
positions. Consequently, if one concludes that ‘pro-investor’ arbitrators profit from the system,
one must similarly conclude that also ‘pro-state’ arbitrators exist and also gain from the
investment system. Be that as it may, since states and investors can select the arbitrators of
their choice, the parties are able to maintain the balance of interests within the tribunal. 
Moreover, if states are not satisfied with the current system of appointments of arbitrators, they
are able to change it. For example, the roster system as introduced in CETA may have an
influence in changing the dynamics of the selection procedure. According to the new CETA
system, if the party-appointed arbitrators fail to make the appointments within the prescribed
time limits, the arbitrators will be appointed by the Secretary-General of ICSID based on a list,
which was pre-determined by the CETA contracting parties. The fact that the roster will be
compiled exclusively by the CETA contracting parties will allow them to select ‘pro-state’
arbitrators for the roster. This will tilt the balance within the arbitral tribunal to their
advantage, because the respondent state can potentially select two of the three arbitrators,
namely, its own arbitrator and the chair from the roster, if no chair has been appointed by the
arbitrators. This may undermine the very foundations of arbitration (and of justice): the equality
of arms between the parties.
Similarly, the proposal of the European Commission for a permanent investment court system
(ICS) will allow states to select all the judges of this two-tier court system exclusively,
thereby they can exclude any arbitrator/judge they consider to be ‘pro-investor’. Hence,
investors will no longer be able to choose an arbitrator/judge of their choice. Thus, there is
already a trend visible towards enabling states to exclusively select the arbitrators/judges,
while at the same time excluding the involvement of the investors/claimants.
To conclude, it should be noted that investment arbitration is traditionally based on a system
of party autonomy in which the disputing parties appoint their own arbitrators. In doing so both
parties choose individuals they believe are likely to be sympathetic to their cause. If states feel
uncomfortable with the current pool of arbitrators, they are free to expand that pool by
selecting ‘new’ individuals. In this way, states can also actively widen and improve the diversity
of the pool of arbitrators/judges, for instance, by selecting more women and non-Western
individuals.
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7 COSTS: DIVERSION OF PUBLIC MONEY FROM PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES
The growing number of ISDS cases and the broad range of policy issues they raise have put the
system of investment arbitration under intensive scrutiny by states, NGOs, and other
stakeholders. This discontent is the result of a perceived failure in the functioning of the ISDS
system, particularly, in relation to (i) its legitimacy and transparency; (ii) problems of
consistency of the arbitral decisions; (iii) concerns about the independence and impartiality of
arbitrators; and (iv) the alleged costly and time-consuming nature of arbitrations. This
section seeks to provide some clarity regarding the alleged high costs of investment arbitration.
FDI is positively correlated with the quality of domestic legal institutions. In a recent study
by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in relation to the Italian judicial system, it was found
that, ‘the inefficiency of the Italian judicial system has contributed to reduced investments,
slow growth, and a difficult business environment’. Therefore, the reduction of FDI as a
result of inefficient domestic courts should be taken into account when evaluating the relative
costs of ISDS. Notwithstanding the high costs associated with international arbitration, 
businesses often still prefer ISDS as a mode of dispute resolution over litigation in many
domestic courts because it is less time-consuming, more effective, and, as a result, often less
expensive. National courts, as an alternative to ISDS, do not necessarily inspire greater
confidence. 
Despite the largest cost component identified in ISDS cases relating to the fees and expenses
incurred for each party’s legal counsel, there is no comprehensive study that shows that
litigation in domestic courts is less costly or that states need to allocate fewer resources within
their own jurisdictions. Indeed, the actual costs of the domestic court system are difficult to
measure because they are ‘hidden’ and covered by the national budget, i.e., the various costs
are ‘generalized’ and covered by the whole population.
The IIA universe consists of more than 3,200 agreements, made up of 2,902 BITs and 334 other
IIAs (such as FTAs or economic partnership agreements with investment provisions). Yet only 568
treaty-based cases have been reported, in which ninety-eight states have acted as
respondents. This must be compared to the thousands (or tens of thousands) of claims that
domestic courts must deal with on an annual basis, and the tens of millions of euros required by
states to establish an independent judiciary. In-house lawyers, everyday expenses of running
national courts, staff, etc. all come at a cost.
Looking at the established nations in the EU and the United States, the judicial systems are
very diverse and vary from state to state. The single ‘justice’ market does not exist and will not
exist in the foreseeable future in the EU. Indeed, the 2015 EU Justice Monitor confirms the
significant divergences in the quality of the judicial system in the various EU Member States.
Similarly, the quality and expertise of the judiciary also differ from state to state in the
United States. One of the most important considerations to ensure that foreign investors
consider all EU Member States and all U.S. States equally attractive is to provide the same high
standard of protection across these regions. Otherwise, more developed EU Member States and
US States with more developed judicial systems will attract greater investment and the gap will
only increase.
While the public debate continues to gain momentum, weighing the pros and cons of ISDS and
its (real) alternatives deserves careful attention. As the domestic judicial systems do not seem
to be better equipped for the resolution of investment arbitration disputes, ISDS offers a more
suitable mechanism to deal with this task. The alleged high costs of such a private justice
procedure are limited to those incurred mostly for each party’s legal counsel. At the same
time, it is clear that, often, foreign investors do not feel comfortable bringing a claim against
the host state before its domestic courts. Indeed, studies confirm that many judicial systems
are not meeting the minimum standards of the rule of law and are slow and inefficient.
Therefore, international arbitration is a necessary and useful alternative for resolving
international disputes. Despite the high costs of international arbitration and the low chances
of ultimately receiving compensation, foreign investors still prefer international arbitration
rather than domestic courts.
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8 ‘CHILLING EFFECT’ ON STATE REGULATORY POWERS
For a useful discussion of the regulatory chill theory, it is first of all necessary to provide a
workable definition. In their study for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Professor
Tietje and Associate-Professor Baetens extensively touch on the issue of regulatory chill. They
define regulatory chill as the situation in which ‘a State actor will fail to enact or enforce bona
fide regulatory measures because of a perceived or actual threat of investment arbitration’ in
which they distinguish between (a) not drafting particular legislation in anticipation of
arbitration; (b) chilling legislation upon awareness of arbitration risks; and (c) chilling
legislation after the outcome of a specific dispute. The definition rightfully assumes that
the chilling of male fide regulatory measures via ISDS is beneficial and therefore does not merit
any discussion. Regrettably, discussion has still arisen from those who publicly voice favouring
the exclusion of ISDS in any BIT as ‘local citizens and [local] companies do not have this option
either’. 
The regulatory chill theory appears to presuppose that ISDS impacts on legislative processes.
However, as Tietje and Baetens show, of all concluded ICSID cases up to 2014, 47% relate to
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executive or administrative acts, such as permits and licenses, whereas only 9%, or fourteen
cases, relate to legislative acts. Citing researchers Jeremy Caddel and Nathan Jensen, they note
that ‘given the low rate of disputes involving legislative branch activity, arguments that
investor-state arbitration may encroach on the legitimate prerogatives of domestic
governments appear to be overstated. Democratic legislatures should embrace investor-state
arbitration as an additional check on executive branch misbehavior.’ 
Keeping the above-mentioned in mind, the following scenario might be helpful to illustrate the
underlying issues. Chilling effect on state regulatory powers may, for instance, arise if a
government concludes that oil and gas production ought to be state-controlled. It believes this
should enhance the government’s international geopolitical standing, while domestic price
control would shield the population from international oil prices fluctuations. The government
therefore decides to expropriate half the ownership of a large foreign-owned gas production
facility without paying just compensation. It also enacts laws that empower the government to
set the consumer gas prices independently whilst restricting gas exports. This government and
its Parliament believe that the government action serves the public interests. However, the
compensation of the investor in these cases is also an important parameter. In this context,
should these regulations be ‘chilled’ to a level that respects property rights? If so, would the
local judiciary necessarily strike down the public policy choices made by the legislative and
executive branches of government? Practices in countries like Argentina or Venezuela suggests
that the judiciary of a country taking such radical decisions may not be able or willing to
counter the will of its government. This is precisely why IIAs contain provision for ISDS. The
contracting states permanently offer foreign investors their agreement to engage with an
independent, non-political forum for dispute settlement in instances where a foreign investor
feels its investment is treated discriminatorily or expropriated without just compensation and
informal dispute resolution no longer seems fruitful.
Although in many ISDS cases the problem is not this straight-forward, it is useful to bear in mind
the basic rationale behind international arbitration as a solution to investor-state disputes.
Foreign investors do not lightly decide to request international arbitration. As discussed in the
previous section, it is expensive with no guarantee of success, and although it may resolve the
legal and financial aspects of a dispute, the relationship with the host state will not necessarily
be restored through the process. Countries that seek to align their laws and regulations
regarding, e.g., employment or environmental protection, with international standards
pertaining to these policy fields, are not likely to be successfully challenged by foreign
investors via ISDS. So, from what do the allegations of ‘regulatory chill’ derive?
(101)
P23
(102) 
8.1 Accessible logic of the ‘regulatory chill’ theory
If a person were to face significant liabilities in taking a particular action, that person would be
less likely to take that action. That is, in essence, the rationale behind the ‘regulatory chill’
argument against ISDS. In a democracy, policy-making and enacting regulation centres around
finding a balance between all interests involved in a way that enjoys the majority support in the
legislative branch. Consequently, there can be a minority or minorities, – business, labour
unions, academic experts or non-governmental groups – that would like to see a different
balance being struck in a specific instance. For example, a government can decide to re-allow
nuclear power activities, leading environmental groups to argue that energy-related and
environmental legislation has been ‘chilled’ in favour of economic interests.
If a legal act has been enacted without due process or if it defies the rule of law, for example
because of its discriminatory nature or its inconsistency with overarching legal principles, the
act, its implementation, or enforcement could be ‘chilled’ by the judiciary branch on the basis
of a lawsuit filed by an interested party. Indeed, chilling regulation is at the core of policy-
and law-making by the legislative and executive branch and it depends on where one stands in
a specific discussion whether the (perceived) chill provokes a good or unwanted outcome.
However, of all influences on the regulatory process of a host state, does ISDS have an
inappropriately chilling effect? Does it unduly restrict states’ regulatory powers?
P24
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8.2 Can ‘regulatory chill’ be measured?
Measuring the aforementioned categories of ‘chill’ that result from ISDS is virtually impossible,
as it is would not be possible to discover which draft legislation has been withheld or whether
ISDS-related risks, more than other risks (e.g., related to domestic legal procedures by
nationals) constituted the determining factor in chilling proposed legislation. As Tietje and
Baetens rightfully note, ‘regulations related to public interests such as the environment, health
and natural resources are often fraught with political debate, and the possibility of ISDS may
be just one of a number of factors leading to the regulatory chill’. Often-cited on the
matter of regulatory chill is the well-known tobacco company Philip Morris, which filed
investment claims against Uruguay and Australia over the adoption of legislation to restrict
tobacco marketing. These cases are still pending and have not led to actual changes in
legislation. In fact, France and New Zealand are now considering following Australia in
introducing mandatory plain packaging of cigarettes. It seems hard to imagine that these
countries presented such legislation without being aware of the similar laws Australia enacted
and the challenges it faced upon that enactment.
In any event, arbitral awards do not call upon, let alone force, host states to chill their laws and
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regulations. They only deal with the question of the right to compensation under the given
circumstances on the basis of the relevant BIT. The government’s persuasion to roll back
specific legislation may come from the substantial motivation laid down in the award, leading
to a government’s reconsideration of which other measures can equally lead to its policy ends
while observing its international law obligations.
Even where a state has indicated that the apparent risk of ISDS or the outcome of a particular
case forms a risk to its regulatory powers, such a statement could be made for political reasons.
For example, the recent terminations of several BITs by Indonesia and South Africa may indeed
serve to protect these countries’ regulatory powers, however, not necessarily with the aim to
protect public interests such as human rights or the environment. Protectionist motives could
also play an important role in a government’s position vis-à-vis investor protection and ISDS,
which seek to eliminate discriminatory treatment.
In short, a wide array of factors lead to particular laws being enacted and other options being
set aside, whereby the compromise of relevant interests that is made with each law or policy
implies that all government action is chilled vis-à-vis certain interests. It is impossible to
measure the influence of ISDS as a potential factor on law- and policy-making processes,
although ISDS is not likely to have more influence on these processes than, e.g., the legal
actions domestic stakeholders can initiate within the local legal system.
Law and policies are enacted within the boundaries of general principles of law, such as due
process and human rights, and of policy principles, such as proportionality and subsidiarity.
Where such boundaries are crossed, legislative or executive acts can be chilled by various
mechanisms, such as parliamentary debate, the local judiciary, or ISDS. However, describing
ISDS as a force that unduly restricts countries’ legislative branch in exercising its sovereign
powers to regulate, or that unduly chills existing or proposed legislation, has no basis in
political science or analysis of international (investment) law and ISDS statistics. The fact that
regulatory chill cannot be measured may help those who support the theory when influencing
public opinion. However, in the scholarly or policy debate, this impossibility should nullify the
regulatory chill theory, as does the fact that the vast majority of ISDS cases are not brought on
the basis of legislative acts, but rather due to executive acts. Although cases often cited in this
respect, such as those concerning Phillip Morris and Vattenfall, may stem from legislative acts,
the fact that thus far such acts have not been ‘chilled’ – let alone unduly chilled – further
invalidates the ‘regulatory chill’ claim.
P26
9 ISDS ALLOWS INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES TO BY-PASS NATIONAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS
One of the main arguments against the inclusion of an ISDS provision in the TTIP is that this
mechanism allows foreign companies to by-pass national judicial systems, possibly at the
expense of domestic investors. Therefore, the critics argue that this kind of provision would
grant foreign investors greater procedural rights than domestic investors, who do not have
access to this parallel, extra-judicial legal track. Moreover, the EU and United States have well-
functioning domestic legal systems and provide for robust protection of property rights. The
question that follows these arguments is whether there is truly a need for international arbitral
procedures when investors have access to such trustworthy domestic judicial systems. 
Instead of viewing the IIA system as a way to by-pass domestic courts, it would be more
productive to explore the complementary role it plays in the effective protection of investors.
As a starting point, a number of IIAs oblige investors to exhaust domestic remedies before
referring the dispute to international arbitration. In a recent award, the tribunal in Dede v.
Romania dismissed the investor’s claims and concluded that it lacked jurisdiction in relation to
the matter before it because the investor had not satisfied the jurisdictional requirement in the
Romania-Turkey BIT (1996). Under this BIT, the investor’s right to submit the dispute to
arbitration was subject to either the local litigation being unfinished within one year, or the
exhaustion of local remedies.
Moreover, investors are often unable to submit a claim before domestic courts on alleged
violations of an IIA. To date, investors’ claims before national tribunals have been based solely
on domestic law and not international law. For example, investors are precluded from
submitting NAFTA-based claims in the domestic courts of Canada and the United States. 
Finally, it may be difficult in some countries to ensure that the rule of law is applied by
domestic courts or their executive branches in an impartial and independent way which results
in a final decision consistent with fundamental principles of public law. One example where
this was an issue was in Transglobal Green Energy v. Panama. In this case, the investor had to
resort to international arbitration because the Panamanian government failed to implement
the decision of Panama’s Supreme Court and, thereby, breached the Panama-United States BIT.
Another example is the recent Yukos case, which revealed that it was in practice
impossible for the Yukos shareholders to resort to domestic courts due to their lack of
independence. 
Article 26 of the ICSID Convention allows states to make exhaustion of domestic remedies a
condition of consent to arbitration. However, relatively few states have included such a
requirement in their investment treaties. On the contrary, over the years, developed countries
have sought to grant their investors direct access to international arbitration. By removing the
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requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies and allowing immediate access to
international procedures, BITs guarantee faster and more efficient proceedings. Although the
average BIT arbitration nowadays takes three years, this is still considerably faster than
the time it takes to exhaust available remedies in many developed national judicial systems.
The preference for international arbitration for investors involved in a dispute against the host
state based on an international investment treaty is understandable since investors seek a
neutral forum to resolve their disputes. With this understanding, investment arbitration should
not be seen as simply the viable route in the face of ‘untrustworthy’ domestic courts, but rather
the most viable option in light of the international character of the dispute.
Another option for foreign investors is the practice of espousal of claims in the framework of
diplomatic protection offered by the states. However, this option has been regarded as
arbitrary and unsatisfactory for investors. This is because the investor’s home state has
complete discretion over the commencement, prosecution, and settlement of such a claim, as
well as whether the investor will in the end obtain full compensation, even if the state received
it. Moreover, litigation in domestic courts of states other than the host state is liable to
lead to state immunity and territorial jurisdiction problems—hardly a promising alternative.
In general, domestic courts of the EU Member States do provide reliable mechanisms for
resolving disputes. However, the quality (assessed from effectiveness, efficiency, and
accessibility standpoints) of domestic judicial systems differs from one state to another. A
notable example of inefficiency in the domestic dispute resolution system is the use of the so-
called ‘Italian torpedoes’. In essence, ‘Italian torpedo’ is an abuse of the lis pendens rule. The
rule is set forth in the EU Regulation on jurisdiction, recognition, and enforcement of judgments
in civil and commercial matters (‘Brussels I Regulation’) and embodies a formal criterion
to avoid parallel proceedings: if another court is already seized of a matter, the court second
seized must decline jurisdiction. Although the very purpose of this jurisdictional criterion is to
ensure predictable, certain, and neutral litigation outcomes, it has been used strategically to
delay the proceedings by instituting a legal action in Italy regardless of whether or not Italian
courts have jurisdiction, taking advantage of significant delays characterizing Italian courts.
Shortcomings of domestic judicial systems have also been identified in the United States.
For example, the NAFTA tribunal in Loewen v. United States, reviewing the Mississippi trial,
characterized it as ‘a disgrace’ ‘[b]y any standard of measurement’. 
Granting foreign investors access to international arbitration constitutes an effective protection
tool. IIAs provide for the national treatment of foreign investors in order to safeguard
equal treatment between national investors and foreign investors and to secure that states will
conform to internationally set minimum standards of treatment. Moreover, since foreign
investors are less familiar with local laws and court practices and domestic courts may be
perceived by foreigners to favour local parties, investment arbitration appears as a strong
alternative.
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10 TRADING ISDS FOR GREATER MARKET ACCESS?
Opening up one’s market to foreign investments with non-discrimination guarantees is quite a
big step after merely liberalizing trade in the greater scheme of international economic
integration. Whilst domestic producers in critical sectors could still be protected via import
tariffs, such protection is much harder to maintain when sectors are faced with foreign investors
in their own market.
The extent to which market access will be granted, how investors’ rights are defined, and what
courses for redress are offered will be the result of negotiations between the parties to an
international investment agreement. This can either be a BIT or a FTA that also covers FDI.
Obviously, given their broad remit, the number of potential hurdles and bargaining chips in FTA
negotiations is much larger compared to when negotiating a more limited BIT. From the outside
it may prove very hard to reverse-engineer the bargains made during such negotiations.
Whether the inclusion of ISDS or the limitation of market access came first may then seem like a
‘chicken or egg’ story: has market access been limited because ISDS was included, or was ISDS
accepted because market access already was limited for other policy reasons?
An important pre-determinant is whether one starts from a post-establishment or already
made investments-only basis, or a pre- and post-establishment basis, which also includes
market access. The standards of treatment of foreign investors under European BITs mostly
apply to post-establishment investments only. However, the new EU FTAs that include an
investment chapter also deal with the liberalization of trade in services. Those provisions can
be relied upon in relation to pre-investment activities, but without the ISDS guarantees that the
investment chapter provides. The standards of treatment included in the US Model-BIT, and
those of several other developed non-EU countries, apply to both pre- and post-establishment
rights. This approach creates additional discussions on market access, more so than the
post-investments-only approach. In this case, states can negotiate on the basis of positive
lists, which only name the sector to which foreign access is allowed, or negative lists, which only
comprise of the banned sectors, for example, for national security reasons.
From a legal perspective, once a country opens up its market (fully or partially) to foreign
investors on the basis of an international investment agreement, it must ensure the observance
of the standards of treatment included therein. Traditionally, observance of these standards of
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treatment was ensured through the country’s inclusion of ISDS provisions in the investment
agreement. ISDS, as such, should therefore not affect a country’s considerations on the extent to
which it will open its markets to foreign investors. Countries can address specific concerns, inter
alia, by carefully drafting the definition of investment and of services, working with positive or
negative lists, and by enacting or amending additional, non-discriminatory national legislation
regarding critical markets. For example, national investments by subsidiaries of foreign
investors in healthcare or education could be addressed by putting in place laws dealing with
ownership and management of investments in those markets, requiring, e.g., a minimum of 51%
domestic ownership or a majority of nationals on the management board.
In sum, granting internationally recognized standards of treatment, such as non-discriminatory
and fair and equitable treatment, to foreign investors via an international investment
agreement may raise questions regarding the extent of market access for those investors. The
inclusion of ISDS provisions – a standard practice – will not grant additional market access to
foreign investors. Market access is a legitimate policy matter influenced by various factors that
are weighed differently by each government. Where different treaty practices on market access
and investment protection meet, the success of the negotiations will depend on the contracting
states’ willingness to overcome hurdles by finding creative solutions and effective drafting. The
draft CETA text in which the ISDS provisions are explicitly intended only to apply to established
investments may serve as an example in that regard.
P31
11 RECEIVING FDI WITHOUT INVESTMENT TREATIES
Virtually all countries worldwide, whether a developed or developing one, seek to increase FDI
levels with the aim of financing public infrastructure projects, bringing capital, technology,
know-how, and access to new products and markets. As a general rule, for policy- and law-
makers FDI helps improve the countries’ productive capacity by benefitting from the global
economy. Accordingly, in recent years, the proliferation of IIAs has been the result of the fierce
competition for FDI inward flows and the protection of the country’s investors abroad.
Against this background, an important public policy debate has focussed on whether IIAs help
attract FDI flows, particularly to developing countries, and the potential impact of IIAs on FDI
flows. Critics of the system have pointed out that countries, such as Brazil, without an IIA
relationship with their partners, are still major recipients of FDI flows from these very same
countries. While this fact highlights the relevance of other FDI determinants, for instance,
the existence of natural resources, regulatory and institutional frameworks, as well as sound
domestic policies, the whole picture should be kept in view. In this context, it should be borne
in mind that clear and enforceable rules established by international agreements in order to
protect foreign investors reduce political risks and thereby increase the attractiveness of host
countries. 
Although their prime role is to add an international dimension to investment protection and
foster transparency, predictability, and stability of the investment framework in host countries,
IIAs undoubtedly impact FDI inflows by guaranteeing foreign investors a minimum standard of
treatment and providing a mechanism for dispute settlement. As a result, IIAs reduce the risks
associated with investing abroad and provide a symbol of the host country’s credibility in the
international arena. 
Studies in relation to the impact of IIAs on FDI, despite the existing limitations related to data
constraints and methodological challenges, have provided very heterogeneous results.
However, as a common feature, none of these studies have determined that IIAs have a negative
effect on FDI flows. On the contrary, the majority of studies in this field have concluded that IIAs,
and specifically BITs, do promote inflow levels of FDI. For example, the US share of FDI
stock in Brazil, China, India, or South Africa ranges between 5% and 15%, which is considerably
lower than the US share in global inward FDI stock (i.e., around 25%). Indeed, as mentioned
above, a recently published study by the Dutch Statistical Office has found that FDI flows
increase by 35% after the ratification of a BIT. 
All of the above suggests caution with respect to drawing direct conclusions when criticizing the
relevance of IIAs or BITs on the decision by companies to invest in a given country. A survey of
602 transnational corporations conducted for UNCTAD during the first half of 2007 on whether
the existence of an international agreement (for instance, a BIT) may influence the company’s
decision on which market to invest in, gave the following outcome: 
– 24% of responses: ‘to a very great extent’;
– 48% of responses: ‘to a limited extent’;
– 23% of responses: ‘do not use them at all’;
– 9% of responses: ‘do not know’.
This would mean that, for an overwhelming majority of companies (72%), the existence of IIAs
that have entered into force remain a factor in order to make an investment decision. The same
survey concluded that IIAs, specifically BITs, ranked in the middle of FDI determinants for
developing countries. The most important factors identified by the survey affecting investment
decisions by transnational corporations were (i) the host country’s macroeconomic and political
stability; and (ii) the strength of the country’s regulatory and institutional environment. 
(123) 
(124)
(125)
P32
(126) 
(127)
(128)
P33
(129)
12 
© 2017 Kluwer Law International. (All rights reserved). A Wolters Kluwer Company
Additionally, IIAs and BITs particularly matter for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs),
which unlike powerful transnational corporations, do not have the ability to negotiate
individual investment contracts with host governments. Evidence of this is the fact that a
significant number of investment arbitration claims were submitted by such smaller
companies. 
Any potential impact of international, bilateral, or regional agreements with investment
provisions in attracting FDI should be seen in the context of a myriad of determinants. Key
among these is the economic attractiveness of FDI recipient countries because of (1) their
market’s size and growth rate; (2) average income per capita; (3) the availability and costs of
raw materials and natural resources; as well as (4) other factors (skills, cheap labour,
infrastructure, etc.); and (5) the institutional characteristics of the host country (its judiciary
system, red tape, and corruption levels). 
The challenges to enhance the attractiveness to FDI within the public policy arena have led to a
situation where countries decide to pursue different paths. The decision on which path to
follow, and whether or not to have IIAs as part of it, is a matter of choice for governments which
need to consider a number of factors. These factors may include the level of the country’s
economic development, geopolitical characteristics, comparative trade and investment
advantages, and the general approach to bilateral or regional cooperation.
For instance, Brazil has very recently signed new generation BITs with Mozambique and Angola.
While these BITs do not include the classic ISDS provisions, they contain a whole toolbox of
dispute avoiding and dispute resolution tools. These BITs prove that even Brazil considers it
necessary to create an international legal framework, mainly with a view to support its
investors, who are increasingly investing abroad.
To conclude, investment treaties are an important tool for states in attracting FDI. Of course,
they are not the only instruments to attract FDI and states may well choose not to enter into
them and still have a stable and attractive investment climate. No available studies have
concluded that IIAs have a negative effect on FDI flows. In any case, investors normally know
perfectly well how to calculate risks, and investment treaties with ISDS provisions are one
(important) factor in this calculation.
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12 GENERAL CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
This EFILA article attempts to address most of the criticisms against ISDS in the context of the
EU FTAs negotiations. The research has revealed that most of the criticisms are supported
neither by the facts nor by the investment arbitration practice and case law. In particular, this
article reveals that the ISDS system is still the most suitable forum for resolving international
investment disputes and that it generally provides for adequate resolution of investment
disputes, for both investors and states. In this context, it is important to reiterate that states
have been consistently winning more disputes than investors, which defeats the general claim
that ISDS is supposedly pro-investors. In addition, the ISDS system contains a number of
safeguards to ensure that the arbitration procedures are conducted in an efficient, impartial,
and proper manner.
The article highlights the incremental improvements of the system over time. The users of ISDS
have not stood still but continue to improve the system where necessary. Improvements were
initially made in NAFTA and have now been adopted by the EU in its current FTA negotiations
such as in CETA, EU-Singapore, and TTIP. The improvements relate in particular to the increase
of the transparency of arbitral proceedings and the tightening up of the codes of conduct for
arbitrators, requiring higher standards for impartiality and independence.
At the same time, the article also sheds light on areas that could be, and are being, further
improved upon. For instance, the European Commission seeks further improvements to the ISDS
system by proposing the creation of a new Investment Court System (ICS) with an appeal
mechanism. This proposal would fundamentally alter the current system of party-
appointed arbitrators by providing for pre-selected judges, who will be solely appointed by the
contracting parties. Accordingly, the investor would no longer have any say in the selection of
the judges of the ICS. This change would counter any remaining critique regarding the
supposedly existing conflicts of interests of arbitrators. However, it cannot be excluded that the
contracting parties would appoint judges who may be particularly receptive to arguments of
the states, when they are respondents in disputes. In order to avoid the creation of a ‘pro-state’
investment court, the contracting parties would have a particular responsibility to avoid any
such perceptions when making the appointments – otherwise investors will not use the system.
In addition, the European Commission’s proposal provides for the creation of a permanent
Appellate Tribunal, comparable to the one within the WTO. While this would provide the
opportunity for both states and investors to have a second shot by reviewing the decision of the
tribunal which decided the dispute, this would delay the proceedings further and make them
more expensive for both parties. There is a clear risk that this would prevent in particular SMEs
from using the system, because of the increased costs. It also carries the risk that states will
abuse the appeal possibility by artificially driving up the costs for the claimant. In order to
avoid such risks, it would be necessary to add a mechanism for throwing out ‘frivolous’ appeal
requests, and ordering the party which is found to have submitted a ‘frivolous’ appeal to bear
all the costs, including those of the other party. In addition, it may well be worth considering
(133) 
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